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PERCEPTION AND DECISION AT THE THRESHOLD
OF TORT LAW: EXPLAINING THE
INFREQUENCY OF CLAIMS
David M. Engel*
INTRODUCTION
The most intriguing question about injury victims in the tort law
system has been lost in a fog of specious assertions, contentious de-
bates, and political posturing.1 That question, seldom asked and al-
most never answered, is why the vast majority of injuries never cross
the threshold of tort law.2 Indeed, most injury victims, even those
who could bring legitimate tort actions, do not assert a claim of any
kind against their injurer.3 Instead, they absorb their losses and at-
tempt to pay injury costs by drawing on their own resources, their
health and accident insurance, or government programs and benefits.
* SUNY Distinguished Service Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School. For their comments
on this Article, thanks go to Marc Galanter, Fred Konefsky, and Lynn Mather. Thanks also for
the many contributions of two dedicated research assistants: Frances Stephenson and Lauren
Gray.
1. Marc Galanter has chronicled the seemingly endless debates over tort law and the inaccu-
rate or misleading statements that have accompanied them. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, 2005 James
McCormick Mitchell Lecture, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users, 53
BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1415 (2006); Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Con-
tingency Fee and Its Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457 (1998); Marc Galanter, Real World
Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1098-1101 (1996) [hereinafter Galanter,
Real World Torts]; Marc Galanter, The Tort Panic and After: A Commentary, 16 JUST. Svs. J. 1
(1993); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 3-5 (1986).
For an analysis of the underlying politics of these discussions, see WILLIAM HALTOM &
MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 79
(2004).
2. See Galanter, Real Word Torts, supra note 1, at 1101 (citing studies that demonstrate the
low rate of claiming in injury cases); see also Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few
Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 448-49 (1987) (summarizing empirical studies showing low claim-
ing rates in injury cases); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of
the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1185 (1992) ("[A]t the
outset of the litigation process, a large number of potential plaintiffs with valid claims never
initiate a claim and thereby become instant false negatives.").
3. The term "claim" in this Article refers to a request for compensation or other remedy that
the injury victim lodges with any potential remedial agent, including the injurer. Claims need
not involve litigation or its precursors. Examples of claims not necessarily connected to litiga-
tion include contacting an ombudsman; notifying the Better Business Bureau; contacting the
injurer's insurance company; or presenting a claim to a special compensation fund, such as the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001.
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"Lumping" occurs far more often than claiming;4 and litigation proves
to be a rare event in most personal injury cases, conventional wisdom
to the contrary notwithstanding:
According to a widely cited RAND Corporation study by Deborah
Hensler and others, fewer than one in fourteen injury victims consults
a lawyer, and only one in fifty files a lawsuit. 5 Nine out of ten never
claim, contact their injurer or the injurer's insurance company, or seek
legal counsel. Instead, they absorb the manifold financial and psycho-
logical consequences of their injury and move on. The preference for
lumping appears to extend across countries and cultures, despite some
variation in frequency from one setting to another.6 If research on
tort law were driven by numbers alone, tort scholars would spend
most of their time studying this vast aggregation of pre-legal en-
counters in which injury victims take no action against potential de-
fendants, rather than the iconic but freakishly rare cases in which they
claim, contest, litigate, and appeal.
Yet it remains surprisingly difficult to explain why claiming is so
rare. Why do most injury victims lump their injuries rather than try to
do something about them? Two kinds of explanations are suggested
by the sparse literature on this topic: economic and cultural. The eco-
nomic explanation portrays injury victims as rational actors who weigh
the potential benefits of lodging a complaint or mobilizing the law
against the costs in money, time, and aggravation. 7 The choice to
4. The term "lumping" in this Article refers to instances in which an injured person does not
lodge a claim, see supra note 3, or take any action against the injurer to request or demand
compensation or other remedy. The term was originally popularized by William L.F. Felstiner.
See William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 63, 81 (1974) ("In lumping it the salience of the dispute is reduced not so much by
limiting the contacts between the disputants, but by ignoring the dispute, by declining to take
any or much action in response to the controversy.").
5. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 122 (1991).
6. See, e.g., DAVID M. ENGEL & JARUWAN S. ENGEL, TORT, CUSTOM, AND KARMA: GLOBAL-
IZATION AND LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THAILAND 79-80, 159-61 (2010); HAZEL GENN ET AL.,
PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW 9 (1999); Masayuki
Murayama, Experiences of Problems and Disputing Behaviour in Japan, 14 MEuI L.J. 1, 31
(2007); Saks, supra note 2, at 1183-85. Note that the lumping rate can appear lower-and the
claiming rate higher-in studies that measure rates of claiming in relation to a base of "griev-
ances" (injured party blames someone else for the harm) rather than "injuries" (injured person
may or may not perceive the harm as a result of someone else's act or omission-or may not
perceive the other party as culpable). Such studies are not designed to take account of the large
number of cases that are lumped before they become grievances. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer et
al., The Aftermath of Injury: Cultural Factors in Compensation Seeking in Canada and the United
States, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 499, 505 (1991).
7. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE Dis-
purrEs 1 (1991) (applying a rational actor model to the analysis of formal law and informal "so-
cial norms" in disputes involving cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California); RICHARD A.
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lump represents a considered decision that the payoff for action is
simply not worthwhile in comparison to inaction. The cultural expla-
nation, on the other hand, suggests that societal norms and practices
imbue lumping, complaining, and litigating with particular meanings
that lead people to value or disvalue them in distinctive ways.8 Thus,
it is sometimes said, asserting one's legal interests may be strongly
disfavored in Japan, Korea, or Thailand, 9 but not in what some con-
sider the more adversarial and rights-conscious culture of the United
States.10
Both the economic and cultural perspectives are useful to a certain
extent, yet neither provides an adequate explanation for the predomi-
nance of lumping in injury cases. The economic perspective derives
from assumptions about human cognition and decision making that
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 268-70 (7th ed. 2007) (analyzing relative costs of invok-
ing law compared to reliance on "social norms"); J. Mark Ramseyer, Reluctant Litigant Revisited:
Rationality and Disputes in Japan, 14 J. JAPANESE STUD. 111, 111-12 (1988) (defending a
cost-benefit analysis of the decision to engage in or avoid litigation, and urging a definition of
cost that is attentive to social and cultural factors); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordi-
nary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 80 (1983) (addressing the desirability of analyzing cost
factors in the decision to litigate civil cases in comparison to choosing nonjudicial alternatives).
8. Marc Galanter's work has inspired much scholarship about the connection between culture,
claiming, lumping, and litigation. In his seminal article, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, Galanter engages in a self-described "digression" on
what he calls "litigation-mindedness," noting that persons living in different cultural settings
have widely varying tastes for rights and for the resort to law. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 104
(1974).
Lawrence M. Friedman's work has also been influential in emphasizing the importance of
culture, particularly in the handling of injury cases. Friedman popularized use of the term "legal
culture" to explain these variations: "'Legal culture' refers to public attitudes, norms, values, and
ideas about the legal system." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 97 (1994). He suggests
that a "trait" of legal culture is "that people who have expectations are willing to take concrete
steps to see that their expectations are not disappointed, that justice is done. This is claims-
consciousness, or rights-consciousness." Id. at 99. Changes in legal culture are associated with
variations in the rate and intensity of claiming. In contemporary American society, according to
Friedman, legal culture has produced "the general expectation of justice, and a general expecta-
tion of repayment or recompense for loss." Id. at 75.
9. According to Takeyoshi Kawashima's frequently cited thesis, the Japanese are averse to
litigation for cultural reasons. See Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary
Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (Arthur Taylor von
Mehren ed., 1963). Kawashima's thesis has produced a substantial literature, much of it critical.
See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of
Japan's Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31 (2006). Pyong-Choon Hahm advanced a com-
parable argument of nonlitigiousness with respect to Korean culture. See Pyong-Choon Hahm,
The Decision Process in Korea, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: CROss-CULTURAL STUD-
IES OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE EAST AND WEST 19 (Glendon Schubert & David J.
Danelski eds., 1969). Thai legal culture and attitudes toward litigation are addressed by Engel
and Engel. See ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 6.
10. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW, at ix-x
(2001); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 97.
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have been sharply challenged across many disciplines. Recent studies
provide little support for the view that the mind engages in conscious
deliberation and rational choice in the aftermath of a traumatic injury.
On the contrary, studies of human cognition have convincingly
demonstrated that most thought is unconscious and that our uncon-
scious thought "shapes and structures all conscious thought."'1 Ac-
cording to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, the image of a rational
actor deliberately weighing and choosing among different courses of
action is merely a metaphor and not a valid empirical description of
actual behavior.' 2 Furthermore, the economic explanation fails to ex-
plain why the benefits of lumping would be so much higher than those
of claiming-or why the costs, broadly defined, would be so much
lower-that, when injured, a rational actor would choose inaction
over action in nine out of ten instances.
Similarly, the cultural perspective leaves unanswered many ques-
tions about the prevalence of lumping. For one thing, as noted above,
lumping appears to be strongly preferred across quite different cul-
tures, despite some marginal variation in frequency.13 Why should
this be so, particularly in light of the very substantial cross-cultural
differences in legal consciousness documented by sociolegal research-
ers? 14 Furthermore, as David Nelken has pointed out, we must be
cautious about using culture in a circular fashion as both cause and
consequence, as the explanation as well as the thing that must be ex-
11. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND
AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 13 (1999). "It is a rule of thumb among cognitive
scientists that unconscious thought is 95% of all thought-and that may be a serious underesti-
mate." Id.
12. Id. at 518.
13. See sources cited supra note 6.
14. The cross-cultural literature on legal consciousness is large and growing, addressing varia-
tions across diverse societies. See GAD BARZILAI, COMMUNITIES AND LAW: POLrnCS AND CUL-
TURES OF LEGAL IDENTITIES (2003) (Israel); ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 6; Mary E. Gallagher,
Mobilizing the Law in China: "Informed Disenchantment" and the Development of Legal Con-
sciousness, 40 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 783 (2006); Marc Hertogh, What's in a Handshake? Legal
Equality and Legal Consciousness in the Netherlands, 18 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 221 (2009); Lesley
A. Jacobs, Rights and Quarantine During the SARS Global Health Crisis: Differentiated Legal
Consciousness in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Toronto, 41 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 511 (2007); Setsuo
Miyazawa, Taking Kawashima Seriously: A Review of Japanese Research on Japanese Legal Con-
sciousness and Disputing Behavior, 21 LAW & Soc'v REV. 219 (1987). Studies of legal conscious-
ness in the United States have also proliferated. See, e.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY,
THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE, at xi (1998); V. LEE HAMILTON
& JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE: RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN AND
THE UNITED STATES, at xi (1992); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING
EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 1 (1990); LAURA BETH
NIELSEN, LICENSE TO HARASS: LAW, HIERARCHY, AND OFFENSIVE PUBLIC SPEECH 5-7 (2004);
Austin Sarat, ". . . The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the
Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990).
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plained. 15 A satisfactory view of culture would not treat it in reduc-
tionist fashion as a mere independent variable or "a residual
explanation when other explanations runout. '' 16 And, finally, the cul-
tural explanation for lumping may provide broad insights into widely
shared images and ideas about the use and avoidance of law, but these
images and ideas are not shared by everyone in a given society, nor
are they forever fixed and unchanging. One must also explain how
the general becomes specific-that is, how particular classes of injury
victims come to embrace or resist particular cultural norms and prac-
tices in specific times and social locations.
What if we were to make a fresh beginning? Rather than starting
with either the economic or cultural model, what if we were to search
as broadly as possible among all available empirical studies of injury
victims' perceptions and decisions and seek clues that might explain
the widespread preference for lumping over claiming? In this Article,
I attempt to reframe the discussion of injury cases at the threshold of
tort law by incorporating both the economic and cultural forms of ex-
planation into a broader, empirically based view of how humans actu-
ally respond to physical harm. Instead of the familiar, step-by-step
"decision tree" model of legal decision making,17 I present an alterna-
tive approach that draws on studies of mind, cognition, and decision
making, as well as cultural interpretation and ethnography. Because
the research literature on lumping by injury victims is relatively mea-
ger, it is not yet possible to draw definitive conclusions about why
claiming and litigation occur so infrequently. Nevertheless, I will pre-
sent an alternative account of lumping that reflects contemporary
models of human decision making and incorporates the scattered but
illuminating empirical studies of how real people respond to painful
and harmful life experiences.
Part II begins this reexamination of lumping by analyzing the as-
sumptions about human cognition and behavior that underlie the deci-
sion tree model. It then presents an alternative model that rejects the
15. David Nelken, Law, Liability, and Culture, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL
PRACTICE 21, 32 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009) ("How can we avoid the ever-
present danger of circular argument? (They do it that way because that is how they do it in
Japan, in Holland, or wherever.)").
16. Id. at 32.
17. See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 5; William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming ..., 15 LAW & Soc'y REv. 631
(1980-1981); Herbert M. Kritzer et al., supra note 6; Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Griev-
ances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 525
(1980-1981); Saks, supra note 2. I have used a variation of the decision tree in my own work.
See David M. Engel & Eric H. Steele, Civil Cases and Society: Process and Order in the Civil
Justice System, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 295.
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step-by-step, rational choice approach and instead views the human
mind as organically connected not only to the body itself (the so-
called "embodied mind") but also to the physical, social, and cultural
environment. This alternative model of the human mind highlights
the dual quality of cognition, both in its fast, automatic aspects and its
slower, deliberative aspects-what some scientists call System 1 and
System 2 thinking.18 Part III applies this model of cognition to the
experieiice of injury and examines the empirical studies that depict
the embodied mind as it registers, interprets, and responds to painful
and traumatic events. Part IV looks more closely at the role of the
environment-physical, social, and cultural-in shaping the percep-
tion of injury as well as the determination of an appropriate response.
Part V explores the recursive process through which the injury vic-
tim's internal narrative is shared with others whose responses can
reshape and redirect the victim's response. Part VI offers tentative
conclusions about the prevalence of lumping and the directions that
future research might take.
In this initial effort to reconceptualize lumping, I have chosen to
focus on physical injuries. The territory to be explored is vast, and
one must start somewhere. I believe that what is true of claiming (or
non-claiming) behavior with respect to physical injuries could prove
applicable to other kinds of injuries, such as emotional harms, damage
to property, and reputational injuries. Moreover, because researchers
have discovered that the human body plays a central role in the
processes of cognition, interpretation, and decision, an initial focus on
harms to the body should yield especially rich results. If, in Daniel
Kahneman's words, "you think with your body, not only with your
brain,"'19 then the cognitive response to bodily trauma or damage
should prove a useful starting point for a more general attempt to
explain injury victims' overwhelming preference for lumping over
claiming.
II. TOWARD A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF INJURY AND LUMPING
Sociolegal analyses of the tort law system have generally relied on a
linear, stepwise model of decision making by the injury victim. 20 This
18. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 13 (2011).
19. Id. at 51.
20. See sources cited supra note 17; see also David M. Engel, Lumping as Default in Tort
Cases: The Cultural Interpretation of Injury and Causation, 44 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 33, 38 (2010)
("Turned on its side, the decision tree becomes the injury 'pyramid' that has provided the basis
for most of the empirical research on tort law conducted during the past few decades, including
my own.").
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model is often presented as a pyramid, the base of which consists of
injurious events, while the upper levels consist of resources, institu-
tions, or procedural options that the victim might select in his or her
quest for a remedy.
FIGURE 1: PYRAMID MODEL OF THE TORT LAW SYSTEM
2 1
Injuries
A detailed variant of the conventional pyramid model appears in an
influential article by Michael Saks. 22 It turns the tort pyramid upside
down and presents it as a chart with the base (consisting of all actiona-
ble injuries, not just those that become grievances) on the top and the
tip (consisting of injuries that have gone through all phases of the liti-
gation process) on the bottom.
21. Figure 1 is adapted from a number of sources. See Galanter, Real World Torts, supra note
1, at 1101 figi; see also HALTOM & McCAN, supra note 1, at 79 fig.2; Miller & Sarat, supra note
17, at 544 figi. The representation of the tort pyramid in Figure 1, as contrasted with the
representations in the three cited sources, features a bottom layer consisting of all actionable
injuries, including those that are not perceived as such by the injury victims or do not give rise to
a grievance.
22. Saks, supra note 2, at 1173 fig.3.
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FIGURE 2: INVERTED PYRAMID MODEL2 3
Tortious Injury
Present Absent
Base of actionable injuries
Decisions to claim
Prospective cases presented to lawyers
Lawsuits filed
Settlements negotiated
Trials commenced
for Plaintiff
Trial Verdict
for Defendant
Awards
Changes from additur/remittitur review
Appeals
Compensation paid
The RAND study cited above presents a third variant of the stepwise
model in which the conventional tort pyramid is rotated ninety de-
grees clockwise and depicted in the form of a horizontal decision tree.
23. Id.
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FIGURE 3: DECISION TREE MODEL OF THE TORT LAW SYSTEM
2 4
Deal directly
with injurer
2%
Deal directly
with insurer
4%
100% claiming attorne atore lasitH 19% K :1%17% 4% 2%
All models of this kind tend to assume that the responses of injury
victims can be understood and mapped in terms of a sequence of
choices at key decision points-to complain or remain silent, ap-
proach the injurer, seek help from a third party, contact the injurer's
insurance company, consult a lawyer, file a complaint, settle, go to
trial, and appeal.25
Such models rest not only on a distinctive understanding of how
humans behave in the face of crisis or trauma but also, perhaps less
obviously, on a set of assumptions about the human mind itself. They
tend to assume that humans respond to challenging events in their
lives by deliberately choosing among clear-cut options and by pursu-
ing the pathways that appear most appropriate, rewarding, moral, or
just. As we shall see, however, current research casts doubt on the
validity of these assumptions.
First, injury victims are not like consumers who coolly and dispas-
sionately choose among different brands of toothpaste. Rather, they
are often severely traumatized individuals who have been shaken
physically and, in many cases, suffered painful wounds, scars, and dis-
abilities. They are frail and fallible beings, not sensible utility maxi-
mizers, and may not yet have recovered from a physiologically,
emotionally, and psychologically devastating experience.
Second, even in the absence of traumatic injuries, it appears that
human decision making does not typically depend on a rational weigh-
ing of options. In the terminology of Richard H. Thaler and Cass R.
24. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 122 fig.5.2.
25. See id.; see also Kritzer et al., supra note 6; Saks, supra note 2, at 1185.
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Sunstein, Humans, rather than "Econs" (homo economicus), should
be the actors we envision when we try to understand how law inter-
sects with life.2 6 Humans, as opposed to Econs, usually make their
decisions on the basis of impulse, mistake, bias, and distortion, and are
themselves unaware of the factors that prove determinative in their
responses.27
Thinking with their bodies and not just with their conscious minds,2 8
humans perceive events such as injuries through the activation of ex-
isting neural pathways and the triggering of general images and princi-
ples. Although we experience "thinking" as a purely intellectual
process, it actually involves multiple bodily components, including our
nervous, muscular, and respiratory systems. Perceptions and interpre-
tations derive to a surprising extent from one's physical state. For ex-
ample, Daniel Kahneman reports that individuals who are already
smiling tend to experience "a state of cognitive ease," causing them to
perceive new experiences with a sense of comfort, trust, and familiar-
ity, as compared to individuals who are stony-faced or frowning.29 So
powerful is this bodily "priming" effect that it occurs even when the
smile is artificially imposed on subjects by requiring them to hold a
pencil horizontally in their teeth, forcing their mouth into a pseudo-
smile. 30 Those whose bodies were smiling, even if they did not really
"mean it," tended to perceive things differently from others who were
not smiling, with or witho.t the help of a pencil in their teeth.3' From
this experiment, it is possible to imagine how significantly the trau-
matically wounded bodies of injury victims might shape their cogni-
tion, as well as their perceptions and decisions about negligently
inflicted harms.
In order to reconceptualize how injury victims form perceptions and
make decisions about future action or inaction, it is necessary to re-
think the self that experiences injurious events. Antonio Damasio hy-
pothesizes that the self "comes to mind" through a series of steps in
which the brain and body are inextricably linked.32 The sense of self
26. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6-8 (2008).
27. See id. at 7-8.
28. KAHNEMAN, supra note 18, at 51.
29. Id. at 59-60.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See generally ANTONIO DAMASIO, SELF COMES TO MIND: CONSTRUCTING THE CONSCIOUS
BRAIN (2010). With respect to the inextricable link of brain, body, and sense of self, Damasio
observes that
the brain's protoself structures are not merely about the body. They are literally and
inextricably attached to the body. Specifically, they are attached to the parts of the
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as an active and aware entity begins with spontaneous primordial feel-
ings of existence.33 It progresses through the formation of a core self,
which provides images of the individual engaged with external ob-
jects.34 The final step in the emergence of the self, according to
Damasio, is the development of the autobiographical self, which is
"defined in terms of biographical knowledge pertaining to the past as
well as the anticipated future. ' 35 The autobiographical self "em-
brace[s] all aspects of one's social persona."'36
Consistent with Damasio's model, the autobiographical self would
appear to be central to the process through which injuries are exper-
ienced, connected to the identity of the person who has been harmed,
and then associated with a set of ideas about the meaning of the expe-
rience and how to respond. Although most aspects of the self operate
without human awareness and are beyond the reach of conscious de-
liberation or control, Damasio notes that the autobiographical self op-
erates both consciously and nonconsciously:
[T]he autobiographical self leads a double life. On the one hand, it
can be overt, making up the conscious mind at its grandest and most
human; on the other, it can lie dormant, its myriad components
waiting their turn to become active. That other life of the autobio-
graphical self takes place offscreen, away from accessible conscious-
ness, and that is possibly where and when the self matures, thanks
to the gradual sedimentation and reworking of one's memory.37
Damasio's concept of the emergent self provides a starting point for
reimagining how humans interpret and respond to injuries. After an
injury, nonconscious interpretive processes would begin to operate
immediately. The harm would trigger both an organic response and a
cascade of images and ideas through which the individual would make
sense of what had happened. At the same time, the individual would
attempt to position this traumatic experience in the flow of the autobi-
ographical narrative that constantly runs through one's mind, shaping
both behavior and sense of self.38
body that bombard the brain with their signals, at all times, only to be bombarded back
by the brain and, by so doing, creating a resonant loop. This resonant loop is perpetual,
broken only by brain disease or death.... [T]he body is best conceived as the rock on
which the protoself is built, while the protoself is the pivot around which the conscious
mind turns.
Id. at 21.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 22-23.
35. Id. at 23. The autobiographical self is discussed more extensively in Part V of this Article.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 210.
38. DAMASIO, supra note 32, at 23-26.
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It must be emphasized that much of this perceptual and interpretive
process takes place nonconsciously and is not the product of reasoned
analysis or deliberate choice. Individuals may at times engage in con-
scious decision making as they weigh alternatives and choose their
course of action; but even when they consciously choose one option
over another, their decision is powerfully influenced by the noncon-
scious processes that come before. 39 Our sense of careful, rational
choice is often illusory. As John A. Bargh has observed:
Automaticity pervades everyday life, playing an important role in
creating the psychological situation from which subjective experi-
ence and subsequent conscious and intentional processes originate.
Our perceptions, evaluations, and the goals we pursue can and do
come under environmental control. Because these perceptual inter-
pretations, likes and dislikes, and reasons for our behavior are not
consciously experienced, we make sense of them in terms of those
aspects of which we are consciously aware, and our theories as to
what would have caused us to feel or act that way. 40
According to this view of human cognition, then, it is a mistake to
conceive of the earliest stages of personal injury cases in terms of the
body receiving a wound followed by the intellect debating how to re-
spond. Rather, we should imagine body and mind together experienc-
ing and interpreting the injury in relation to the self and the
environment through a process that is largely nonconscious or precon-
scious. 41 When the body suffers harm, what Kahneman 42 and others
refer to as System 1 would spring immediately into action. System 1
comprises the automatic processes that quickly and effortlessly gener-
ate the "impressions and feelings that are the main sources of the ex-
39. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 18, at 24 ("System 1 runs automatically and System 2 is nor-
mally in a comfortable low-effort mode .... When all goes smoothly, which is most of the time,
System 2 adopts the suggestions of System 1 with little or no modification."). Even the errors
and biases associated with the nonconscious thought of System 1 may frequently affect our con-
scious System 2 mental processes. See id. at 28 ("Because System 1 operates automatically and
cannot be turned off at will, errors of intuitive thought are often difficult to prevent. Biases
cannot always be avoided, because System 2 may have no clue to the error.").
40. John A. Bargh, The Automaticity of Everyday Life, in 10 THE AUTOMATICITY OF EVERY-
DAY LIFE: ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 50 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. ed., 1997).
41. Mark Johnson enumerates five different levels at which the embodied self engages with
the world: as a biological organism, a "flesh-and-blood creature that I call 'my body'"; as an
ecological body that is part of and in constant interaction with its physical environment; as a
phenomenological body that we ourselves sense and are aware of during our daily actions and
routines; as a social body engaged in "intersubjective relations and coordinations of experience";
and as a cultural body that is engaged with "cultural artifacts, practices, institutions, rituals, and
modes of interaction." MARK JOHNSON, THE MEANING OF THE BODY: AESTHETICS OF HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING 275-77 (2007). The phenomenon of personal injury would be experienced and
understood at all of these levels. See id.
42. KAHNEMAN, supra note 18, at 13.
[Vol. 62:293
2013] EXPLAINING THE INFREQUENCY OF CLAIMS 305
plicit beliefs and deliberate choices of System 2... . System 1 has
learned associations between ideas ... ; it has also learned skills such
as reading and understanding nuances of social situations. '43 The
"fast thinking" of System 1 prepares and shapes the more deliberative
and effortful "slow thinking" of System 244:
The main function of System 1 is to maintain and update a model of
your personal world, which represents what is normal in it. The
model is constructed by associations that link ideas of circum-
stances, events, actions, and outcomes that co-occur with some reg-
ularity, either at the same time or within a relatively short interval.
As these links are formed and strengthened, the pattern of associ-
ated ideas comes to represent the structure of events in your life,
and it determines your interpretation of the present as well as your
expectations of the future.45
Rather than a pyramid or decision tree, then, Figure 4 presents an
alternative model of injury perception and decision making.
FIGURE 4: ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF INJURY
PERCEPTION AND RESPONSE
43. Id. at 21-22.
44. "System 1 and System 2 ... respectively produce fast and slow thinking." Id. at 13. "Sys-
tem 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex
computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of
agency, choice, and concentration." Id. at 21.
45. Id. at 71.
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In this model, the embodied mind carries out its rapid and auto-
matic responses to the sensation of physical pain, its integration of the
harmful event into the internal narrative of the autobiographical self,
and its slower and more deliberate decision making.46 In addition,
this model situates the embodied mind in a physical, social, and cul-
tural environment that provides meaning-making images and causal
explanations. As we shall see, the environment plays a key role in
injury perception and response, both at the nonconscious and con-
scious levels. Indeed, it is misleading to draw a sharp distinction be-
tween self and environment because they are mutually constitutive,
which is why the boundary around the embodied mind in Figure 4 is
represented by dashes rather than a solid line. Humans are quite liter-
ally the creatures of their environment, which leaves its traces in their
minds and on their bodies. Two key components of the environment
are the media and the law. Both can influence the physical, social, and
cultural aspects of the injured self's surroundings in ways that criti-
cally affect perception and decision making.47
The injury victim does not perceive, interpret, and deliberate on her
own. The alternative model depicted in Figure 4 comprises not only
the self and the environment but also the social networks to which
individuals belong.48 An individual's spontaneous interpretation of a
harmful event may be conditioned or transformed by hearing how an-
other person views the matter, particularly if that person is a friend,
family member, or coworker. Interactions with others may, even
before the injury occurs, set the stage for particular kinds of noncon-
scious or conscious responses by the victim. After the injury, signifi-
cant interpersonal interactions often reshape or even transform the
injured person's thoughts, causing the autobiographical self to tell a
different story about the injury that took place. There is, in other
words, a recursive and interactional dimension to the interpretive pro-
cess that takes place over time and draws third parties into the vic-
tim's processes of cognition and response to injuries.
Figure 4, then, illustrates the reimagined model of injury perception
and response that serves as the basis for discussion in the remainder of
this Article.
46. See infra Part III.
47. See infra Part IV.
48. See infra Part V.
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III. INJURY AND THE EMBODIED MIND: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS
Part II presented an alternative to the conventional linear, stepwise
model for analyzing the responses of injury victims. The question re-
mains, however, what light this reconceptualization can shed on one
specific kind of traumatic experience-personal injury-and whether
it can help to explain why the vast majority of potential tort plaintiffs
engage in lumping rather than claiming. This Part asks how injury
victims' automatic and nonconscious cognitive and interpretive
processes might shape their conscious thoughts and decisions. By
drawing together a diverse set of empirical findings, it identifies com-
monalities in the way individuals experience serious injuries, particu-
larly painful ones. These include a feeling that one's identity has been
transformed and that one is no longer the same person; a sense of
disembodiment and even alienation from one's own body; a failure of
language and an inability to communicate current perceptions and
ideas even to close friends and family; an immediate effort to grasp
the cause of the injury and a preference for causes that do not point
clearly to the responsibility of another person; and a strong tendency
toward inaction known as the "status quo bias. '49 The following dis-
cussion suggests how these common responses to physical injuries
might lead the victim to lump rather than claim.
Perhaps the most immediate sensation of the injured person is the
shocked realization of existential change: "When illness or injury
strikes, physical changes occur and people experience their bodies dif-
ferently.... As they try to adjust to extreme bodily changes, they may
feel separated from their bodies (disembodied) or overwhelmed by
physical sensations (especially pain). '50 Injuries are not the only
source of pain, but very often pain does accompany injuries. When
suffering from pain, injury victims can become strangers to their own
body: "the painful body emerges as 'thing-like'; it 'betrays' us and we
may feel alienated and estranged from it as a consequence."' 51 In Jean
Jackson's words, "Pain exiles sufferers from their own bodies, which
surface as 'strangely other."' 52 Amputated limbs still seem to be there
49. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 26, at 34-35.
50. Mary H. Wilde, Embodied Knowledge in Chronic Illness and Injury, 10 NURSING INQUIRY
170 (2003).
51. Gillian Bendelow & Simon Williams, Pain and the Mind-Body Dualism: A Sociological
Approach, 1 BODY & Soc'y 83, 88 (1995).
52. Jean E. Jackson, Pain and Bodies, in A COMPANION TO THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE
BODY AND EMBODIMENT 370, 381 (Frances E. Mascia-Lees ed., 2011) [hereinafter THE BODY
AND EMBODIMENT].
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
in phantom form,53 and injured limbs that are still attached seem to be
missing or no longer connected to the body.54 Mary H. Wilde quotes
an eloquent passage from Reynolds Price, who suffered a spinal cord
injury: "When can I live again in my body? and where am I now? As
much as any specter in a ghost tale, I felt like a spirit haunting the air
above his old skin that had suddenly, for no announced reason,
evicted me and barred my return. '55 In some cases, years may pass
before a person with a severely disabling injury can regain a stable
and positive personality,56 and initially the injury victim may experi-
ence strongly negative personality changes that disrupt relations with
former friends:
At first, people noticed a big change in me. I mean, I was really
depressed, with good reason. Maybe that's why a lot of my friends
got scared and stopped seeing me; they couldn't deal with the big
change they saw in my personality. I've pretty well got my old per-
sonality back now, and I have developed a whole new set of friends.
It took a long time, but what a difference it makes to life.57
In a group of studies of individuals injured in motor vehicle acci-
dents, summarized by Jennifer L. Lucas, as many as 50% suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as depression, fear, fa-
tigue, and headache. 58 Moreover, during the years immediately fol-
lowing such injuries, drivers reported heightened levels of "personal
safety concerns, worries about driving, trait driver stress, exhaustion,
and negative physical symptoms" as compared to drivers who had not
been in motor vehicle accidents.5 9 In short, experiencing an injury
produces changes in mind and body that are defined by greater levels
of stress and fear, particularly with respect to the same activity-in
this case driving-that led to the individual's injury.
53. See, e.g., Thomas Csordas, Embodiment: Agency, Sexual Difference, and Illness, in THE
BODY AND EMBODIMENT, supra note 52, at 137,149-50 (discussing the phenomenology of phan-
tom limb perception).
54. See Jackson, supra note 52, at 381 ("Some accounts vividly describe rejection, in no uncer-
tain terms, of the painful body part."); see also Fr6d6rique de Vignemont, Embodiment, Owner-
ship and Disownership, 20 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 82 (2011).
55. Wilde, supra note 50, at 170 (quoting REYNOLDS PRICE, A WHOLE NEW LIFE 13 (1994)).
56. See Christine Carpenter, The Experience of Spinal Cord Injury: The Individual's Perspec-
tive-Implications for Rehabilitation Practice, 74 PHYSICAL THERAPY 614, 621 (1994) ("It took at
least 4 years before things began to click into place, and life goes on fairly normally.").
57. Id. at 623 (quoting an interviewee identified by the pseudonym "Randy").
58. See Jennifer L. Lucas, Drivers' Psychological and Physical Reactions After Motor Vehicle
Accidents, 6F TRANSPORTATION RES. 135, 137-38 tbl.1 (2003). Another study reported "imme-
diate anxiety" as a significant response to pain. See David J. Crockett et al., Factors of the
Language of Pain in Patient and Volunteer Groups, 4 PAIN 175, 179 (1977).
59. Lucas, supra note 58, at 142. According to Lucas, women appeared to be particularly
susceptible to these symptoms. Id.
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From the new world of pain, disorientation, depression, and aliena-
tion from one's own body, it becomes more difficult to communicate
with others. As Elaine Scarry has observed, "Whatever pain achieves,
it achieves in part through its unsharability, and it ensures this un-
sharability through its resistance to language."' 60 Language often fails
the injury victim:
[P]atients both pursue language-answers, names, definitions,
meanings that promise reassurance and cures-and avoid it. Al-
though they have found that language fails to represent their being-
in-the-world, that promising meanings turn out to be siren-mean-
ings, that their quest to be understood as pain-full beings remains
unfulfilled, they also want to use language to escape that experi-
ence, that world. Although they report feeling profoundly misun-
derstood, pigeonholed, and categorized by everyday-world
language, this is the language they continue to pin their hopes on.
61
To sum up, an injury, particularly a painful one, transforms the
identity of the victim in ways that defy his or her powers of explana-
tion. As Bendelow and Williams observe, "[P]ain ... is ultimately a
matter of being-in-the-world. As such, pain reorganizes our lived
space and time, our relations with others and with ourselves. ' 62 The
language and logic of everyday experience are no longer applicable in
this new existence. Injury victims tend to feel, initially at least, that
they are no longer themselves, that they are disconnected even from
intimate friends by the profound transformation that has occurred in
their lives, and that their access to everyday life and its discourses may
be blocked by an inability to communicate the reality of their new
status. Under such circumstances, it is reasonable to speculate that a
severely injured accident victim would not readily launch an effort to
obtain a remedy. It is difficult to pursue a claim while alienated from
self and friends, unable to rely on language to communicate one's new
circumstances and needs.
. Perceptions of causation that arise when an injury occurs may also
create formidable obstacles to lodging a claim. Cognitive scientists
report that, in response to new events, the human mind automatically
and without conscious effort applies a causal logic based on concepts
that "arise from human biology. ' 63 Lakoff and Johnson observe that
60. ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD 4
(1985).
61. Jean Jackson, Chronic Pain and the Tension Between the Body as Subject and Object, in
EMBODIMENT AND EXPERIENCE: THE EXISTENTIAL GROUND OF CULTURE AND SELF 201, 222
(Thomas J. Csordas ed., 1994) [hereinafter EMBODIMENT AND EXPERIENCE].
62. Bendelow & Williams, supra note 51, at 87.
63. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 171.
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humans conceptualize events in terms of causal metaphors, 64 which in
turn derive from "everyday bodily experience," such as walking, run-
ning, pushing, pulling, throwing, and holding. 65 Because of the large
number of causal metaphors familiar to each of us, there is neither a
single, objectively "real" cause for a given event-such as an injury-
nor a single logic of causation available to those who experience it.
Multiple causal explanations may be triggered during System 1 think-
ing, and the inventory of such explanations is connected to the cul-
tural and social environment. 66
The causal framing of an injury affects the victim's tendency to seek
a remedy or to lump the loss. 67 If a causal explanation does not point
clearly to the responsibility of another party, it is unlikely that the
victim will seek to hold anyone else responsible by lodging a claim.
Particularly in the case of serious injuries, pain may automatically trig-
ger certain causal associations. Jean Jackson points out that one of the
most common associations with pain and suffering is the idea that the
injured person must have somehow deserved his or her fate: "The
Latin root for 'pain,' after all, means punishment. In a just and or-
derly world, our reasoning goes, innocent people would not be suffer-
ing like this, so something must be wrong."68
Other researchers agree that pain appears to trigger a nonconscious
perception of self-blame to explain the cause of the injury.69 Eva Jo-
hansson and her coauthors, for example, interviewed Swedish women
with medically undefined musculoskeletal pain.70 These interviewees
had a pervasive tendency to adopt "self-blaming ideas" and to view
their pain as punishment for their own misdeeds and shortcomings:
64. Lakoff and Johnson observe:
Most of ordinary human thought-thought carried out by real 'rational animals'-is
metaphoric, and hence not literal. It uses not only metaphor but also framing, meton-
ymy, and prototype-based inferences. Hence it is not 'logical' in the technical sense
defined by the field of formal logic. It is largely unconscious. It is not transcendent,
but fundamentally embodied. Basic inference forms arise partly from the spatial logic
characterized by image schemas, which in turn are characterized in terms of the pecu-
liarities of the structures of human brains and bodies. The same is true of aspectual
reasoning-reasoning about the way we structure events, which appears to arise out of
our systems of motor control. Metaphorical thought, which constitutes an overwhelm-
ing proportion of our abstract reasoning, is shaped by our bodily interactions in the
world.
Id. at 514.
65. See id. at 171, 183-93.
66. See infra Part IV.
67. See Engel, supra note 20, at 67-68.
68. Jackson, supra note 52, at 378.
69. Bendelow & Williams, supra note 51, at 92.
70. Eva E. Johansson et al., The Meanings of Pain: An Exploration of Women's Descriptions
of Symptoms, 48 Soc. Sci. & MED. 1791 (1999).
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Ideas about the pain emanating from wrong decisions, or even bad
behavior, were presented. It concerned feelings of being insuffi-
cient, in relationships with parents-in-law, parents, husbands or chil-
dren. The women talked about guilt, but also grief and shame. This
might involve a period of addiction (alcohol or tranquilizers), hav-
ing been sexually abused or beaten, or an abortion .... 71
Similarly, Richard Schulz and Susan Decker interviewed individuals
with spinal cord injuries and found that a remarkable 43% blamed
themselves to some extent for causing their injury.72 Furthermore,
56% believed they could not have done anything to avoid it.73
Neither perception-self-blame or inevitability-is likely to lead the
victim to view another party as the cause and seek to hold him or her
responsible. 74
The existing literature thus provides scattered insights and sugges-
tions about the imagery of causation that may be triggered by an in-
jury. Clearly, we need more studies of the potential links between the
causal perceptions of injury victims and their tendency to lump rather
than claim. Nevertheless, considerable evidence points to the exis-
tence of victim-blaming causal imagery-the assumption that the vic-
tims should have taken greater care, that they somehow deserve the
harm that befell them, and that the injury itself was fated to happen or
may even have been a form of cosmic punishment.75 Assuming that
such imagery is in fact widespread, it is likely to be deeply embedded
71. Id. at 1795.
72. Richard Schulz & Susan Decker, Long-Term Adjustment to Physical Disability: The Role
of Social Support, Perceived Control, and Self-Blame, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1162,
1166 (1985).
73. Id.
74. In an intriguing but somewhat ambiguous national survey, D.C. Girasek discusses the
problem of victim-blaming when accidents occur. Research suggests that the prospects for a
more sympathetic view of accident victims may be "bleak." See D.C. Girasek, How Members of
the Public Interpret the Word Accident, 5 INJ. PREVENTION 19, 23 (1999). Girasek explored
popular interpretations of the concept of "accident" by polling persons who had not necessarily
suffered injuries themselves. He found that 26.1% of the randomly selected interviewees be-
lieved that accidents are caused by fate, and only 25.1% thought they are predictable. Id. at 21
fig.2. Presumably, injury victims would have to perceive their accidents as predictable before
they could conclude that someone else might be responsible for failing to take adequate precau-
tions. The fact that only one in four Americans view accidents as predictable by anyone-the
victim or the injurer-therefore appears to be consistent with the broad-based tendency not to
lodge a complaint against the injurer in most cases. On the other hand, 82.8% of Girasek's
respondents believed accidents were "preventable," a concept he associates with the popular
perception that accident victims can and should take better precautions to protect themselves
from harm. See id.
75. See, e.g., BEATRICE A. WRIGHT, PHYSICAL DISABILITY-A PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACH 64
(2d ed. 1983) (explaining that persons without disabilities unconsciously believe that "the cripple
has committed some evil act"); Douglas H. Cook, A Faith-Based Perspective on Tort Causation,
16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 455, 462 (2004) (noting a common perception that injuries are part of
God's plan, except when the defendant clearly sinned by choosing to disobey God).
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in the cognition of individuals who suffer an injury and triggered non-
consciously in the moments after they suffer harm. When the initial
System 1 perception of causation is framed in terms of fate or per-
sonal shortcoming, it is exceedingly difficult to dislodge and replace it
with a view of another person as the responsible causal agent. 76
Even if the injury victim does attribute causation and blame to an-
other person, the status quo bias may still inhibit claiming.77 Human
cognition and decision making are subject to inertia. We are biased in
favor of staying with what we have, even when a rational balancing of
costs and benefits might lead us to act in order to change our circum-
stances. Indeed, Thaler and Sunstein argue that the status quo bias is
so significant a factor in human behavior that it can serve as the basis
for "soft" policy practices, which they refer to as "nudging. '78 Instead
of mandating a particular behavior, they contend, the government
needs only to designate it as the default option and leave it to individ-
uals to choose other options that policymakers deem less desirable.
Human inertia will then cause many to accept the officially preferred
default rather than take the initiative to select some other course of
action. 79
Applying the status quo bias to the behavior of injury victims is a bit
tricky, and much depends on how the situation is framed.80 When an
individual suffers an injury, what exactly does he or she perceive as
the status quo-the situation beforehand or afterward? The differ-
ence could be significant. If an injury victim understands the post-
injury situation to be the status quo, then that fact alone could influ-
ence her to lump rather than act affirmatively to change her circum-
stances. If, however, she understands the status quo to be her
situation before the injury, then she may be more inclined to pursue a
claim in order to restore the status quo ante and avoid suffering a loss.
As Kahneman observes, "Animals, including people, fight harder to
prevent losses than to achieve gains .... Loss aversion is a powerful
conservative force that favors minimal changes from the status quo in
76. Kahneman notes that System 2 is not efficient in correcting the errors or biases of System
1. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 18, at 28. Moreover, a general "confirmation bias" leads people
to test hypotheses by "seek[ing] data that are likely to be compatible with the beliefs they cur-
rently hold." Id. at 81.
77. See generally William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
78. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 26.
79. See id. at 5-6.
80. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 77, at 8 ("[Sltatus quo framing was found to
have predictable and significant effects on subjects' decision making.").
[Vol. 62:293
2013] EXPLAINING THE INFREQUENCY OF CLAIMS 313
the lives of both institutions and individuals." '81 Without further re-
search, it is difficult to say which perception of the status quo predom-
inates in the mind of most injury victims. It may be relevant to note,
however, that in their much-cited article on status quo bias, Samuel-
son and Zeckhauser found that the inertia effect persisted even when
a particular condition was imposed-as is the case for injury victims. 82
Even under those involuntary circumstances, the subjects tended to
adopt an "irrational" preference for leaving things as they were rather
than making the effort to change them. It is therefore plausible to
theorize that the status quo bias, like the sense of identity transforma-
tion and disembodiment, the failure of language, and the perception
of causation, operates to encourage lumping rather than claiming by
injury victims.
IV. INJURY AND ENVIRONMENT
Part III pointed the way to a reconceptualization of claiming and
lumping in injury cases. Rather than accepting the conventional
model of stepwise decision points navigated by rational injury victims,
it proposed a different model of the injured self. In this new concep-
tualization, the traumatized and wounded body is itself the "seat of
subjectivity, '83 and the processes of perception and response occur,
for the most part, without conscious awareness. As we have seen, re-
casting victims' decision making in this way provides us with a prelimi-
nary understanding of why lumping occurs so much more often than
claiming.
Yet any model that focuses on the self in isolation is radically in-
complete. The next step is to place the injured self in its environ-
ment-that is, in the physical, social, and cultural surroundings in
which humans live their lives and conduct their affairs. As Mark
Johnson has observed, contemporary scholarship challenges not only
the dualism of mind and body but also the related and equally untena-
ble dualism of self and environment:
There is no body without an environment, no body without the
ongoing flow of organism-environment interaction that defines our
realities. Once again, the trick is to avoid the dualism of organism
and environment, a dualism that falsely assumes the existence of
81. KAHNEMAN, supra note 18, at 305.
82. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 77, at 39-40.
83. "The possibility ... that the body might be understood as a seat of subjectivity is one
source of challenge to theories of culture in which mind/subject/culture are deployed in parallel
with and in contrast to body/object/biology." Thomas J. Csordas, Introduction: The Body as
Representation and Being-in-the-World, in EMBODIMENT AND EXPERIENCE, supra note 61, at 1,
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two independent entities, each bringing its own structure and
preestablished identity into the interactions. Instead, we must think
of organism (or body) and environment in the same way that we
must think of mind and body, as aspects of one continuous pro-
cess .... We are thus left with the somewhat counterintuitive idea
that the body is not separate from its environment and that any
boundaries we choose to mark between them are merely artifacts of
our interests and forms of inquiry.84
Human subjectivity defines and shapes our environment, just as the
environment defines and shapes our bodies and our self-understand-
ings. 85 The interaction of self and environment molds perceptions,
thoughts, and decisions in both the rapid and automatic System 1
thinking and the slower and more deliberate System 2 thinking. This
Part considers some of the ways in which the environment-physical,
social, and cultural-may encourage individuals to lump injuries
rather than assert claims. As in Part III, the discussion here combines
empirical insights with informed speculation, because we still await
systematic empirical research on many of these questions. It also sug-
gests that the distinction between physical aspects of the environment,
and social or cultural aspects, although convenient for purposes of ex-
position, is artificial and even misleading, because much of our physi-
cal surroundings and all of our perceptions of them are shaped by
culture. The notion that there is some objective physical world "out
there"-outside of culture-is itself a cultural artifact.
A. The Physical Environment
Why might injuries that objective observers consider tortious ap-
pear innocent or natural to the victims? Why might the victims view
their injuries as a normal consequence of the world in which they live
and not assign blame to the potential defendant? The taken-for-
granted arrangements of the physical environment can shape the in-
terpretation of injuries and make them seem natural rather than the
product of intentional or negligent behavior by another. A model that
views the embodied self in relation to its physical environment may
therefore help to explain the tendency to lump injuries rather than
assert claims against an injurer.
84. JOHNSON, supra note 41, at 276.
85. See, e.g., MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 499-500 (Colin
Smith trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1958) (1945) ("The world is inseparable from the subject,
but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable
from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects. The subject is a being-in-the-
world and the world remains 'subjective' since its texture and articulations are traced out by the
subject's movement of transcendence.").
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Lakoff and Johnson suggest that movement of the body through
space plays a primary role in forming the conceptual structures of the
mind.86 But the nature of the spaces through which people habitually
move must also be considered, as well as the technologies that facili-
tate and constrain such movement. Consider stairways. The ability to
move between lower and higher locations seems a "natural" part of
life, and humans have created stairs to facilitate such movement. Of
course, there is nothing natural about stairs-they are an entirely
human creation, although stair-like formations may exist in nature on
hillsides or mountain slopes. Viewed from one perspective, stairs en-
able movement from one level to another; but viewed from another
perspective, they prevent it. For wheelchair users or persons with lim-
ited motor skills, stairs are barriers that make movement impossible.
Yet the physical environment can be changed to eliminate stairs by
designing one-level, ranch-style houses, for example, or by construct-
ing ramps rather than stairways, thereby enabling movement rather
than obstructing it.
Much of the "of course" nature of the physical environment turns
out to be the product of human choice. For Sara Lane, who used a
wheelchair much of her life, it seemed obvious during her childhood
that libraries with stairways were places she could never go.87 Sara's
exclusion from libraries seemed natural and unexceptional to her. As
an adult, however, she came to view barriers to physical accessibility
in her workplace as evidence of discriminatory decisions by her em-
ployers.88 The human choices that shape the physical environment
are often hidden from view or are so obvious that we never think to
question them, and our surroundings tend to take on a deceptively
natural appearance until alternative arrangements become
imaginable.
Such choices may also create or prevent injuries. In the case of
stairways, for example, safety engineers estimate that approximately
one million Americans per year suffer injuries when they ascend or
descend stairs.89 Are these injuries caused by the architect's initial
decision to use the technology of the stairway rather than a ramp, es-
86. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 19 ("Our abilities to move in the ways we do
and to track the motion of other things give motion a major role in our conceptual system.").
87. See DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY
IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 23 (2003).
88. See id. at 26-27.
89. See Patricia L. Jackson & H. Harvey Cohen, An In-Depth Investigation of 40 Stairway
Accidents and the Stair Safety Literature, 26 J. SAFETY RES. 151, 151 (1995) ("The U.S. Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission estimates that approximately 1 million stair-related accidents
occurred in 1990 alone.").
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calator, or elevator, or are they accidents that inevitably accompany
human movement from place to place? Or do people fall down stairs
because of their own physical shortcomings or carelessness? Because
stairs seem such a normal and natural part of our physical environ-
ment, it would rarely occur to injury victims to blame their mishap on
the designers who chose to install the staircase rather than some other
mode of ascent and descent. It is far more likely that injury victims
would view their misfortune as purely accidental (fate), or as the re-
sult of their own mistakes or incapacities (self-blame). 90
Yet safety engineers and ergonomics specialists have come to real-
ize that the risks associated with stairway accidents are not inevitable
and can, in fact, be significantly reduced. For example, accidents are
less likely if stairs are designed with broader treads and shorter
risers,91 and accidents can also be prevented by specifying that treads
and risers must be even rather than uneven in dimension. 92 From an
engineering point of view, the most significant cause of injury on stair-
ways-because it is the cause that is most amenable to risk-reduc-
tion-may not be the victim's carelessness, age, frailty, or disability,
but the design of the stairs themselves: "The findings ... suggest that
anyone who investigates stairway falls should use an ergonomics-
based systems safety approach. This study indicates that stairway
users are too often blamed for injuries that result from stairway and
environmental factors. '93
Thus, some aspects of the physical environment that humans take
for granted and view as natural are actually the product of design de-
cisions that may carry a greater or lesser risk of injury. To the extent
that such decisions are not apparent to injury victims, lodging a claim
after suffering harm becomes unlikely. The naturalization of designed
risk represents a powerful factor favoring lumping. This is actually an
oft-told story in the history of American tort law. When factories and
railroads proliferated in the nineteenth century, they produced an un-
precedented spate of injuries to industrial workers and others who
came in contact with the dangerous machines and production
90. See id. at 153.
91. See id. at 157.
92. See id. at 156 ("We believe from examining our data and the literature that the strongest
pattern for stairway accidents lies in dimensional inconsistency within stairways.").
93. Joseph Cohen et al., Stairway Falls: An Ergonomics Analysis of 80 Cases, PROF. SAvTY,
Jan. 2009, at 27, 32; see also Jackson & Cohen, supra note 89, at 156 ("From a review of our data
and prominent stairway safety literature, we have found that many personal variables and exter-
nal stairway characteristics may not play as great a role in stairway accidents as previously
thought.").
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processes. 94 Although these injuries could have been viewed as the
product of human choice, observers such as Holmes employed im-
agery comparing them to such natural risks as being struck by light-
ning.95 To the extent that injuries are seen as an unavoidable result of
the way things are, tort law would seem to have little to offer, and
lumping appears the only rational response.
The concept of the embodied self, then, takes shape within a physi-
cal environment that defines what is natural and beyond human
choice-even if such definitions can be deconstructed by critical anal-
ysis. The field of products liability law offers countless examples of
technologies whose risks once appeared normal and natural, yet later
proved to be unnecessary when different design decisions were made.
For example, at one time it appeared inevitable that automobile pas-
sengers in a violent collision might be thrown from the car or through
the windshield, but today a car that lacks seatbelts and airbags to pre-
vent "second impacts" is considered defective.96 Similarly, until re-
cently the general public would not tend to blame the manufacturers
of motor vehicles for the 228 deaths and approximately 17,000 injuries
caused each year by vehicles backing up. 9 7 Yet nowadays there is a
growing consensus that vehicles are defective and unsafe if they lack a
rearview camera to guard against such risks.98 And, of course, there is
the infamous McDonald's case, in which it was widely considered ab-
surd for the victim to blame the restaurant when she was burned by
hot coffee that she spilled on herself.99 Only later did it become ap-
parent-to some observers at least-that the injury was the product of
94. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 362 (3d ed. 2005).
95. See 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881) ("Unless my act is of a nature to
threaten others, unless under the circumstances a prudent man would have foreseen the possibil-
ity of harm, it is no more justifiable to make me indemnify my neighbor against the conse-
quences, than to make me do the same thing if I had fallen upon him in a fit, or to compel me to
insure him against lightning."). Holmes assumed that tort liability should not be assigned merely
because of the original decision to build a factory or railroad, but that defendants should be held
responsible only if they committed a particularized act of misconduct that posed an unreasona-
ble and foreseeable risk of injury to the plaintiff. See id.
96. For a discussion of the cultural shifts associated with safety standards concerning the "sec-
ond collision" in automobiles, see Carol A. MacLennan, From Accident to Crash: The Auto
Industry and the Politics of Injury, 2 MED. ANTHROPOL. Q. 233, 239-45 (1988).
97. See Nick Bunkley, U.S. Rule Set for Cameras at Cars' Rear, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2012, at
Al (noting that 44% of the fatalities involve children under the age of five).
98. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration had planned to issue a rule on Febru-
ary 29, 2012 requiring that all passenger vehicles come equipped with a rearview camera by 2014,
but later postponed its action to the end of the year. Currently, 45% of vehicles in the 2012
model year offer such a camera as standard equipment. Id.; see also Nick Bunkley, U.S. Delays
Rule on Rearview Car Cameras, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2012, at B9.
99. For a comprehensive overview of the McDonald's hot coffee case as portrayed by popular
media, see HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 183-226.
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a human decision to sell the coffee at an unusually high temperature, a
decision that carried known risks of serious harm that could have been
prevented by safer production practices. 100
Sara Lachlann Jain argues that "unequally distributed physical in-
jury"101 associated with consumer products should not be viewed as
accidental, but rather as a reflection of design decisions that encode
deeper cultural understandings about whose lives and bodies should
be valued or exposed to risk:
Design decisions ineluctably code danger and injury at the outset of
the production process. Products anticipate the agents that will ani-
mate them temporally and statistically; products and humans simu-
late imagined relationships and worlds. In this sense, Pintos and
cheeseburgers are not so dissimilar, as they both demonstrate how
American injury culture injures as a matter of course .... Elucidat-
ing the issues in this way raises the question of how human wound-
ing counts, who "owns" health, and how it is to count as a social
good. 102
Although injuries appear to be "exceptional" events that randomly
strike a few unlucky individuals, Jain argues that they are actually the
consequence of "cultural work ... which distributes goods and bads
(such as risk, health, mobility, and injury) and also naturalizes cross-
secting relations of subordination.' 10 3
In sum, many aspects of the physical environment are created or
modified by humans; yet, at the same time, the environment shapes
human bodies and minds, and naturalizes certain human activities and
expectations. For this reason, injury victims tend to view many inju-
ries as the inevitable result of living in their familiar environment,
even though a tort law specialist-or critical scholar-might find good
reason to assign blame to someone else for the harm they have suf-
fered. Thus, many potentially actionable injuries are automatically
and nonconsciously perceived as the result of fate, bad luck, or the
victim's own fault. In such cases, lumping appears the only sensible
response, and lodging a claim is all but inconceivable.
B. The Social and Cultural Environment
Individuals experience injuries in an environment defined not only
by the physical spaces and objects they encounter in their day-to-day
activities but also by the cultural meanings and practices through
100. See id. at 189-90.
101. SARAH S. LOCHLANN JAIN, INJURY: THE POLITICS OF PRODUCT DESIGN AND SAFETY
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 151 (2006).
102. Id. at 56.
103. Id. at 152.
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which humans understand important events in their lives. Clifford
Geertz's frequently quoted definition of culture is particularly sugges-
tive in this context, as his imagery portrays an embodied person sus-
pended like a spider in a contextual web of human-created ideas and
images: "Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended
in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those
webs. ' 104 As already noted, even the physical environment is imbued
with cultural meaning and is, in a sense, part of the social and cultural
environment. The discussion in this Part, however, emphasizes as-
pects of culture and society that are not necessarily physical in nature,
and suggests how they shape the interpretation of injuries and the per-
vasive tendency to lump rather than claim.
Injuries are not objective facts; rather, they are events that humans
perceive and interpret within ideational frameworks that reflect a
deep interaction between self and culture. Many injuries are painful,
and one might think that the sensation of pain, at least, represents a
universal constant regardless of culture or social setting. Researchers
have demonstrated, however, that, although nearly all humans are
susceptible to pain, they experience and interpret it differently in dif-
ferent social and cultural contexts.10 5 In this sense, pain itself is a cul-
tural construct, and the cognition of pain connects the individual mind
and body to the social environment of which it is a part:
As with bodies in general, the painful body simultaneously produces
and is produced by culture, reflecting and reproducing it....
... Traditional notions of pain-as-sensation in which a unidirec-
tional nociceptive"0 6 input from the body travels up the dorsal horn
of the spinal cord and is processed by the central nervous system
have been replaced by two-way flows along multiple pathways in-
volving cognitive, emotional, and behavioral inputs that shape a no-
ciceptive signal.107
104. Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 3, 5 (1973).
105. See Mary Moore Free, Cross-Cultural Conceptions of Pain and Pain Control, 15 BAYLOR
U. MED. CTR. PROC. 143, 143 (2002) ("[W]hile the stimulation of pain fibers to tell the brain that
something is wrong is the same among all human beings, the perceptions and control of pain
vary from society to society.").
106. "Nociceptive" means "pertaining to a nociceptor," which is defined as
a receptor for pain caused by injury to body tissues; the injury may be from physical
stimuli such as mechanical, thermal, or electrical stimuli, or from chemical stimuli such
as the presence of a toxin or an excess of a nontoxic substance. Most nociceptors are in
either the skin ... or the walls of viscera ....
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1298 (31st ed. 2007).
107. Jackson, supra note 52, at 372, 374.
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Perceptions and interpretations of pain vary across social and cul-
tural contexts. Such variation is also characteristic of injuries, which
are more complex social experiences than the mere sensation of pain
and, therefore, even more susceptible to cultural framing and defini-
tion. The significance for claiming should be obvious: If individuals
interpret potentially "justiciable problems" 108 as not being injuries at
all, then it is highly unlikely that they will assign responsibility to an
injurer or seek a remedy. Lumping in such situations is not a deliber-
ate choice; it is the only conceivable response to a human experience,
and no alternative response is even imaginable.
Two examples may demonstrate how particular social and cultural
frames can define the same event as an injury or as something quite
different. The traditional Chinese practice of foot binding imposed
pain and permanent bodily disfiguration on young girls.10 9 From one
perspective, this was an injury, particularly because it led to a lifelong
mobility impairment. From another perspective, however, bound feet
were not only considered by some to be beautiful but were also a sign
of nobility. As long as servants were available to carry high-ranking
females from place to place, the inability to walk was not disabling,
although it would become so in any other social setting.110 Another,
more contemporary example, is male circumcision. According to the
Jewish and Islamic religions, circumcision of young males is a sacred
tradition conferring on boys the right of membership in the adult re-
ligious community. When viewed through a different cultural lens,
however, the same act may appear to be a cruel and painful mutilation
forced on a powerless subject and might represent not only a tort but
also a human rights violation. 1 Thus, the very existence of an injury
108. See GENN ET AL., supra note 6, at 5 (surveying the frequency of "justiciable problems" in
the United Kingdom and affected individuals' responses to them).
109. See generally HOWARD S. LEVY, CHINESE FOOTBINDING: THE HISTORY OF A CURIOUS
EROTIC CUSTOM (1966). According to Levy, "Evidence that the child suffered intensely during
the early stages [of binding her feet] is overwhelming." Id. at 26. The "virtual crippling" caused
by footbinding, which was initiated in early childhood, resulted in the physical confinement and
seclusion of "upper-class ladies" and "rendered [them] immune from the social disease of conju-
gal infidelity." Id. at 30; see also C. Fred Blake, Foot-Binding in Neo-Confucian China and the
Appropriation of Female Labor, 19 SIGNS 676 (1994).
110. See WRIGHT, supra note 75, at 11 ("[Bound feet] symboliz[ed] nobility [and] did not
interfere with the functions required of such women and therefore, presumably, was not an ob-
stacle to their goals."). Foot binding ended rapidly in China during the first decade of the twen-
tieth century as a result of dramatic shifts in social and cultural norms, as well as legal
prohibitions. See Gerry Mackie, Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account,
61 AM. Soc. REV. 999, 1001 (1996).
111. See William E. Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional Is-
sues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337, 338 (1984-1985); Eric K. Silverman, Anthropology and Circumcision, 33
ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 419 (2004).
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cannot be taken as a given, but must be perceived as such within par-
ticular social and cultural settings.
Social and cultural contexts also provide interpretive frames for
perceiving the salience of an injury. Broken bones and lacerations
may seem very serious to an office worker or a classroom teacher but
less so to a farmer 112 or a rugby player, 113 for whom they are a normal
and expected hazard of everyday activities. Some American soldiers
in World War II required less than usual amounts of pain medication
for their injuries because they positively associated their wounds with
a "ticket home with honor. ' 114 The perceived severity of an injury is
directly relevant to claiming behavior by the victim. In social or cul-
tural contexts in which a given injury is viewed as less severe, or even
as eufunctional, pursuit of a claim is less likely.115
As we have seen, the experience of injury instantly triggers a cogni-
tive process that associates the harm with one or more causes.'
1 6
Ideas about causation, however, are also embedded in worldviews that
vary dramatically across social and cultural settings. Causal concepts
derive not only from metaphors of bodies moving and acting in space
but also from religious, philosophical, scientific, and other perspec-
tives that provide distinctively patterned explanations of why injuries
happen.11 7 When an automobile struck a woman and broke her leg in
Thailand, for example, she told several different causal stories, almost
in the same breath: she injured the driver in a previous life and her
karma caught up with her; she had beaten a dog and broken its leg; a
malevolent ghost selected her as its victim; her stars were misaligned;
the driver was negligent; he failed to treat a medical condition that
affected his driving; she failed to protect herself against the oncoming
112. See David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in
an American Community, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 551,558 (1984) (noting that farmers in "Sander
County" recounted many serious injuries caused by dangers associated with their way of life and
that they believed "injuries were an ever-present possibility"); see also Adarsh Kumar et al.,
Equipment-Related Injuries in Agriculture: An International Perspective, 7 INJ. CONTROL &
SAFETY PROMOTION 175 (2000) (discussing the frequency and severity of agricultural injuries
across societies and cultures, as well as the tendency to associate such injuries with the conduct
of the workers rather than consider modification of their working conditions or equipment).
113. See P. David Howe, An Ethnography of Pain and Injury in Professional Rugby Union:
The Case of Pontypridd RFC, 36 INT'L REV. FOR Soc. SPORT 289 (2001).
114. Jackson, supra note 52, at 372 (citing Henry K. Beecher, Pain in Men Wounded in Battle,
123 ANNALS SURGERY 96 (1946)).
115. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Faten Sabry, The Propensity to Sue: Why Do People Seek
Legal Actions?, Bus. ECON., April 2007, at 31, 37; see also Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh,
Injury, Liability, and the Decision to File a Medical Malpractice Claim, 29 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
413, 426, 431 (1995).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 63-76.
117. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 13.
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car; and she had failed to perform a merit-making ceremony.118 Such
causal explanations are culturally specific, although their analogues
may be found elsewhere and may appear in different idioms.
Concepts of causation are inseparable from concepts of responsibil-
ity. Indeed, there is reason to think that preexisting assumptions
about who in society should bear responsibility for injuries can affect
how injury victims attribute causation. 119 If a cancer patient is predis-
posed to think that factory owners should be held more stringently
accountable for environmental pollution, he may search for a cause of
his illness that connects it to toxic exposure from manufacturing
plants. If, on the other hand, the same cancer patient is predisposed
to think that most illnesses arise from individual spiritual or dietary
imbalances, then he will be more likely to conclude that his illness was
caused by his own perceived failures. Moreover, as Janice Nadler's
research demonstrates, our preconceptions about the moral character
of the injurer are likely to influence our inclination to blame him or
her for a mishap-an injury caused by a person of good character is
less likely to lead to blame attribution than an identical injury caused
by a person of bad character.1 20 In short, social and cultural concepts
and values become entangled in numerous complex ways with percep-
tions of the causes of injuries and the attribution of responsibility for
them.
Perceptions of causation and responsibility are driven not only by
differences in worldview but also by differences in social status and
power. In Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead, Marc Galanter points
out that torts are one of the few forms of litigation in which "one-
shot" plaintiffs sue "repeat player" defendants, in contrast, for exam-
ple, to landlord-tenant litigation (repeat player v. one-shotter) or di-
vorce litigation (one-shotter v. one-shotter). 12' In part, the distinctive
configuration of tort litigation results from the obvious fact that
"have-not" one-shotters generally have shallow pockets and do not
make good tort defendants as compared to repeat player "haves."
But it has also been demonstrated that injuries are unequally distrib-
uted across social groups. Persons with less wealth are more likely to
suffer injuries, 22 and their injuries often come at the hands of those
118. See ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 6, at 21-32.
119. See Engel, supra note 20, at 60 ("American tort law is full of examples illustrating the
conflation of ideas about responsibility and causation, notwithstanding the fact that causation is
theoretically a separate and independent element of an injury case.").
120. See Janice Nadler, Blaming as a Social Process: The Influence of Character and Moral
Emotion on Blame, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 2012, at 1, 2.
121. See Galanter, supra note 8, at 107-10.
122. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 49 tbl.3.18.
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with greater wealth who launch risk-creating enterprises or activities.
Consequently, because of this important structural difference, "haves"
and "have-nots" may tend to hold different views of causation and
responsibility for injuries. "Haves" may tend to endorse views of inju-
ries as inevitable, nobody's fault, or the result of the injury victim's
own carelessness. "Have-nots," who feel less able to avoid harm or to
pay for it when it occurs, may tend to view injuries as the result of
unnecessary risks imposed on them by others.
If social status and power can affect fundamental assumptions about
causation and responsibility, one might expect lumping behavior to
vary depending on whose view prevails in a given social setting. For
example, my research in rural "Sander County," Illinois revealed that
the views of the "haves," which emphasized stoic endurance rather
than claiming as an appropriate response to injuries, tended to prevail
among lawyers, judges, and jurors, over the contrary views of the local
"have-nots." 12 3 Consequently, injury victims rarely asserted claims or
consulted lawyers. Changing social and political circumstances, how-
ever, can bring a shift in the predominance of one perspective over the
other. Even in Sander County in the 1970s, there were preliminary
signs that the influx of "outsiders"-mostly blue-collar workers who
found jobs in a new industrial plant-had begun to challenge the
ethos of self-sufficiency in the face of injuries, and that a contrary view
emphasizing accountability and interpersonal responsibility had
started to assert itself.124 Randolph Bergstrom provides another ex-
ample of such a shift over time, suggesting that social and political
changes in New York City from 1870 to 1910 brought a different per-
spective on causation and responsibility for injuries.12 5 This change in
perspective, according to Bergstrom, led to a sharp increase in tort
litigation at the turn of the twentieth century.
126
Of course, socially marginalized or disempowered persons who fear
personal or social consequences may avoid claiming even when they
perceive themselves to be the victims of injustice and want to pursue
the matter. Individuals who are injured in the workplace may con-
clude that lumping is safer than complaining, which could place their
job or career prospects in jeopardy. These concerns may become par-
ticularly acute when the victims fear biased reactions based on their
123. See Engel, supra note 112, at 560, 565, 567; accord CAROL J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW
AND COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN TOWNS (1994).
124. Engel, supra note 112, at 578.
125. RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN NEW YORK CITY,
1870-1910, at 168 (1992).
126. Id. MacLennan, supra note 96, tracks a comparable shift in perception of the causes and
prevention of automobile injuries from 1920 to the present.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
gender, race, cultural difference, or sexual orientation. 127 Rape in the
workplace is a form of personal injury known to result in lumping
precisely because of these concerns, as well as the often-justified fear
that the victim will not be believed and will be viewed as a liar and
troublemaker.1 2 8 Similar considerations may prevail when injuries oc-
cur in other social settings. In Sander County, a Latina woman whose
husband was injured expressed her opposition to his pursuit of a legal
remedy in the following terms: "I was afraid that maybe they'd say our
kind of people are just trying to get their hands on money any way we
could.' 29 In cases such as these, inequalities or discrimination in the
social environment can affect perceptions and decision making, and
can lead injury victims to lump otherwise actionable harms.
Consideration of the social and cultural environment in relation to
injury perception requires some attention to specific geographical lo-
cales or social fields in which values and world views are held. It is
not enough to speak of American or Japanese culture, as if the bound-
aries of a nation-state somehow enclose a homogeneous population in
which values and modes of cognition are universally shared. Re-
searchers must also take into account the "local knowledge" that can
be found in particular human communities. 30 Nevertheless, in con-
temporary mass societies, there are forces in the environment that cut
across communities and produce broad-based images and understand-
ings of injury. Two of the most powerful of these environmental
forces are the media and the law.
Media coverage of tort law can have a significant impact on individ-
ual cognition, as was dramatically illustrated by the McDonald's cof-
fee case. William Haltom and Michael McCann demonstrate that
newspaper reporting of Stella Liebeck's serious injury followed a dis-
127. Some studies of sexual harassment in the workplace (not necessarily involving personal
injuries) note that women who have been victimized by such misconduct may resist bringing a
legal challenge for fear of blame, retaliation, and other negative repercussions. See, e.g., L.
Camille Hebert, Why Don't "Reasonable Women" Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND.
L.J. 711, 724-25 (2007); Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII As a
Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008).
128. Hebert, supra note 127, at 725 n.69, 727 n.85.
129. Engel, supra note 112, at 568 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRE-
TIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1982) ("Like sailing, gardening, politics, and poetry, law and ethnogra-
phy are crafts of place: they work by the light of local knowledge."). Arthur Kleinman makes a
related point, relevant in particular to injury cognition, by emphasizing that those who study the
perception and interpretation of pain must take into account the "local moral worlds" in which
the body experiences it. See Arthur Kleinman, Pain and Resistance: The Delegitimation and
Relegitimation of Local Worlds, in PAIN As HUMAN EXPERIENCE: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PER-
SPECTIVE 169, 170 (Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good et al. eds., 1992).
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tinctive and selective pattern.131 The media tended to privilege the
narrative of litigiousness and personal irresponsibility that the tort re-
form movement was promoting at that time, with substantial backing
from the insurance industry. From initial media reports to subsequent
editorials, cartoons, talk shows, and sitcoms, the hot coffee story dis-
seminated by print and electronic media reached millions of Ameri-
cans and residents of many other countries as well.132 The effects on
individual perceptions of injuries and injury law soon became obvious
to plaintiffs' attorneys across the country, who found that they had to
address the tort reform message and attempt to overcome potential
jurors' anti-plaintiff biases and preconceptions in every case they liti-
gated.1 33 Haltom and McCann suggest that, through their communi-
cation of false or distorted "tort tales," the media have played a key
role in what the authors call "the social production of legal knowl-
edge, 1' 34 and have consistently promoted a politics of individual re-
sponsibility over an ideology of risk reduction and corporate
responsibility. This perspective has become part of the social and cul-
tural environment, and it appears to many (including injury victims) to
be self-evident and "true."
Finally, the law itself exerts a significant influence on the environ-
ment within which injuries are experienced and interpreted. Marc
Galanter wrote many years ago about "the radiating effect of
courts, ' 135 a concept that is taken for granted by mainstream doctrinal
legal scholars, but was somewhat overlooked in law and society schol-
arship at the time. In the 1970s and 1980s, a great deal of effort had
gone into studying the factors that led individuals to use or avoid the
law, but less empirical attentioi had been given to the effect of law
itself on problem perception and dispute behavior. At the same time,
legal scholars, judges, and policymakers tended to accept law's influ-
ence uncritically and overestimated the extent to which legal rules af-
fected the behavior and consciousness of everyday actors. By now,
however, there is a substantial and diverse body of research and the-
131. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 203-06.
132. Several years ago, after I finished delivering a lecture on American tort law in Chi-
angmai, Thailand, a young student in the back of the lecture hall raised her hand and asked (in
Thai), "But what about that woman who sued McDonalds after spilling coffee on herself?"
133. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact that It Has Had Is Between
People's Ears:" Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453,
473-74 (2000).
134. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 1, 5-6.
135. Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT
COURTS 117, 118 (Keith 0. Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983) ("Instead of the centripetal
movement of cases into courts, I want to look at the flow of influence outward from courts to the
wider world of disputing and regulating.").
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ory that explains when and how law matters.136 Law and society are
seen as mutually constitutive. Thus, it is uncontroversial to assert that
law can-at least under some circumstances-powerfully shape social
and cultural environments, even as it is shaped by them. For example,
Anne Bloom and Paul Steven Miller suggest that tort law's depiction
of plaintiffs' disabilities tends both to draw on and reinforce distorted
and prejudicial understandings of persons with disabilities in Ameri-
can culture.137 Similarly, caps on pain and suffering are undoubtedly
the product of anti-litigation forces in the social and cultural environ-
ment;138 at the same time, caps affect the social and cultural environ-
ment by communicating the message that claims for intangible injuries
are problematic and less consequential than tangible physical
harms. 139 In a more general sense, the creation of such caps reinforces
the message that personal injury claimants will seek every opportunity
to take advantage of hapless defendants unless they are restrained by
the law. This negative message, heard often enough, can filter back to
the perceptual and interpretive processes that operate nonconsciously
from the moment an injury is experienced.
In sum, the environment of the embodied mind plays a critically
important role in the process of cognition and decision making that
follows an injury. Indeed, the environment shapes the very percep-
tion that an injury has occurred and, further, that the injury can be
associated with another human actor. Even when the causal connec-
tion seems clear, social and cultural factors can influence the percep-
tion that the injurer should or should not bear responsibility, as well as
the willingness of the victim to take the matter forward. Moreover,
the self and the environment are not distinct entities but are organi-
cally linked. The environmental factors we have discussed in this Part
are not outside the embodied mind, but actually constitute it and be-
come active even in the automatic System 1 processing that is crucial
to the interpretation of harmful experiences.
Of course, this view of the embodied mind and its environment
does not in itself explain why lumping predominates over claiming
among injury victims. It does, however, provide a starting point for
analysis. The discussion in this Part points to a number of environ-
136. See, e.g., How DOES LAW MATTER? (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998).
137. See Anne Bloom with Paul Steven Miller, Blindsight: How We See Disabilities in Tort
Litigation, 86 WASH. L. REv. 709, 712-13 (2011).
138. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE,
GENDER, AND TORT LAW 170-72 (2010); see also HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 96;
Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53
EMORY L.J. 1263, 1267-68 (2004).
139. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 138, at 170-82.
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mental factors that could lead an injured person to absorb the harm
without taking any action against another person or entity. Some of
them pertain to the naturalization of injury and the hidden nature of
human choices that underlie the creation of risk in society. Others
have to do with predominant value systems, backed by law, religion,
or community norms that tend to valorize self-sufficiency and even
stoicism over the demand for a remedy. Still others point to dispari-
ties in social or political power and the unequal capacity to create and
disseminate norms and concepts of responsibility. Some of these fac-
tors have already been identified and discussed by researchers, but
their influence on the overwhelming tendency to lump serious injuries
still awaits systematic study.
V. AUTOBIOGRAPHY, FEEDBACK, AND RECURSIVITY
The preceding Parts of this Article have sketched a model of injury
cognition and response that situates the "embodied mind" in its physi-
cal, social, and cultural environment. A key element of the embodied
mind is the autobiographical self, an internal narrative that runs con-
tinually in our minds, like a television set that is never turned off.140
The autobiographical self operates nonconsciously and automatically,
but it can also become the focus of slower and more. self-aware System
2 thinking. At such moments, we deliberately explain our experiences
by narrating portions of our lives to ourselves or to others. In this
sense, the autobiographical self has an important social and interac-
tional aspect. The self is, to use Jerome Bruner's term, "distributed"
throughout one's relational networks:
[P]sychologists began to ask whether the wider circle of people
about whom any person cares or in whom he or she confides might
also be complicit in our narratives and our Self-constructions.
Might not the complicit circle, then, be something like a "distrib-
uted Self," much as one's notes and looking-up procedures become
part of one's distributed knowledge. And just as knowledge thereby
gets caught in the net of culture, so too Self becomes enmeshed in a
net of others.14 1
These narratives of the self are never fixed. They constantly change
in response to new events. Furthermore, we tell these stories differ-
ently depending on our purpose, our audience, and our state of mind.
The autobiographical accounts we create for ourselves and others are
not just a record of the past; they are also maps for the future. If I tell
140. See DAMASIO, supra note 32, at 210.
141. JEROME BRUNER, ACrs OF MEANING 113-14 (1990).
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my life story to bolster my identity as this kind of person, I prepare
myself for that course of action.142
What are the implications of the autobiographical self for injury
perception and response? How might it help to explain the preva-
lence of lumping over claiming? A personal injury would undoubt-
edly become a significant event in most people's autobiographical
narrative. The embodied mind would integrate this event instantly
and nonconsciously into its life story, and the injury victim would very
likely describe the injury to others, including friends, family, and co-
workers, as well professional service providers. Each retelling would
provide the injured person with an opportunity for revision, and each
listener might offer comments or reactions that alter the original per-
ception and, recursively, help to create a revised narrative the next
time around. In this process, then, we may find keys to the predomi-
nant tendency to absorb a potentially tortious injury without lodging a
complaint or seeking a remedy.
There can be little doubt that interactions with third parties are ca-
pable of substantially changing one's thoughts and self-conceptions
concerning important matters, including how to respond to a personal
injury. As Kenneth Gergen has observed: "[M]ere differences in the
physical appearance of a bystander were often sufficient to trigger
changes in the person's self conceptions. People were also frequently
responsive to others' reactions, altering their conceptions of self as
others communicated their positive or negative reactions to them. '143
In part, social interactions can affect interpretive processes because
they are linked to the "cognitive biases" catalogued by Kahneman and
others, many of which originate in the effect third persons have on
human subjectivity. For example, the priming effect leads people to
perceive, form judgments, or act in ways that reflect their prior expo-
sure to images, concepts, or ideas, even if such exposure occurs sub-
consciously or is seemingly irrelevant to the matter at hand. 144 People
are so suggestible that implanting a concept in their minds, such as the
142. See ENGEL & MUNGER, supra note 87, at 45 ("The ever-changing stories people tell
themselves and others about who they are alternate with 'new living action.' That is, narratives
of the self follow and explain past experiences, but they also precede new experiences in which
individuals attempt to act out the selves they have narrated and the desires and aspirations asso-
ciated with those selves .... ); see also George C. Rosenwald, Conclusion: Reflections on Narra-
tive Self-Understanding, in STORIED LIVES: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF SELF-UNDERSTANDING
265, 274 (George C. Rosenwald & Richard L. Ochberg eds., 1992) ("New living action follows a
new story partly as a way of catching the life up to the account of the life and partly to express
what is missing from the story.").
143. KENNETH J. GERGEN, TOWARD TRANSFORMATION IN SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE 17 (2d ed.
1994) (citations omitted).
144. KAHNEMAN, supra note 18, at 52-54.
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concept of old age, can lead them unconsciously to walk down the hall
like an elderly person.' 45 It is easy to imagine that injury victims could
be primed by their interpersonal networks to adopt a negative per-
spective toward asserting claims for compensation, since disapproval
of claiming behavior is widespread within many social groups.
A second cognitive bias mentioned by Kahneman is the mere expo-
sure effect, which produces a favorable response to familiar words or
images only because the individual has experienced them previously,
even if the exposure occurred subconsciously.1 46 This type of bias,
too, could be associated with the individual's interpersonal interac-
tions. Certain ideas or concepts repeatedly expressed within one's re-
lational network could affect cognition of new events such as injuries:
for example, by instilling the ethical notion that injury victims should
be stoic in the face of pain and suffering and should not be quick to
assert claims.
A third cognitive bias is the availability heuristic, which, according
to Kahneman, leads people to make judgments about the frequency of
a category based, illogically, on how easy it is for them to retrieve
examples from their memory. 147 Thus, we might imagine that if injury
victims have friends who repeatedly talk about greedy injury victims
and nonmeritorious lawsuits, they would tend to estimate that frivo-
lous personal injury litigation is very common regardless of the evi-
dence to the contrary. The individuals' interpersonal networks could,
in this way, create a bias against taking any action that might associate
them with what is perceived as an epidemic of reprehensible tort
claimants.
Interactions with third parties can trigger cognitive biases, and they
can also change the reasoning and the formation of moral judgments
that follow in the wake of important events such as injuries. a48 As
Jonathan Haidt observes:
We make our first judgments rapidly, and we are dreadful at seek-
ing out evidence that might disconfirm those initial judgments. Yet
friends can do for us what we cannot do for ourselves: they can
challenge us, giving us reasons and arguments ... that sometimes
trigger new intuitions, thereby making it possible for us to change
our minds .... For most of us, it's not every day or even every
month that we change our mind about a moral issue without any
prompting from anyone else.
145. Id. at 53 (citing an experiment by John Bargh and colleagues).
146. Id. at 66-67.
147. Id. at 129.
148. See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY
POLITICS AND RELIGION 47-48 (2012) (citations omitted).
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Far more common than such private mind changing is social
influence. 149
The question remains, however, why social interactions might tend
to have an asymmetrical influence, encouraging injury victims to lump
more than to claim. Here, it is important to recognize that such inter-
actions occur in social contexts in which the anti-litigation ideology of
individual responsibility often predominates. 150 Interactions with
third parties can pressure individuals to conform to dominant social
values or ideologies. Pierre Bourdieu suggests that particular epi-
sodes of "interaction and mutual adjustment" are not isolated social
events, but take place in an environment that already possesses cer-
tain "objective structures which have produced the dispositions of the
interacting agents. ' 151 These social interactions are, according to
Bourdieu, structured by powerful ideas, images, values, and norms in
society, which they tend to replicate.152 The direction of influence is
neither random nor symmetrical. In Bourdieu's words, "the system of
dispositions ... tends to perpetuate itself into the future by making
itself present in practices structured according to its principles.'1 53 In
each encounter, dominant ideas, frameworks, and ideologies-such as
the ideology of individual responsibility and anti-litigiousness-im-
press themselves on the perceptions and decisions of individual actors,
including injury victims, and structure their thoughts.
It is reasonable, then, to suggest that interactions with third parties
would tend to have an asymmetrical effect, causing injury victims to
reshape their autobiographical narratives to conform to values associ-
ated with lumping rather than claiming. Unfortunately, researchers
have not directly tested this hypothesis, 54 although community-based
149. Id. at 47.
150. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 1, at 28-29; see also Engel, supra note 112, at
558-59 (noting the predominance in Sander County, Illinois, of a type of individualism that
emphasizes self-sufficiency rather than rights and remedies in injury cases).
151. PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 81 (Richard Nice trans., Cam-
bridge University Press 1977) (1972).
152. Id. at 80-82.
153. Id. at 82.
154. Researchers have documented the influence of social interactions on lumping and claim-
ing by injury victims in one specialized context that does not, strictly speaking, involve third
parties. Rather, these are cases in which the injurers themselves offer an explanation and apol-
ogy to the injured person. Jennifer K. Robbennolt conducted a scenario study involving an
injury caused by a bicyclist-pedestrian collision. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and
Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REv. 460, 484 (2003). She found that
a full apology expressing sympathy and taking responsibility for the accident had a powerful
effect on her subjects. The apology led them to attribute positive moral qualities to the injurer,
to believe he would be more careful in the future, to decrease their anger, and to feel sympathy
for him. In addition, her subjects-were much more receptive to a settlement offer in the full
apology scenario. See id. at 485-88. Robbenolt's research thus demonstrates how significantly
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ethnographic research suggests that the injured person's social and
cultural surroundings can create an influential moral ethos extolling
self-sufficiency rather than the pursuit of compensation. 5 5 Informed
speculation, however, would suggest that discussing an injury with a
friend or family member could operate in several quite specific ways
to increase lumping and diminish the likelihood that an injury victim
would lodge a claim:
(1) It seems likely that the injured person would talk less with third
parties about an incident that she had already decided to lump and
put behind her, but would communicate more often about an incident
in which she was undecided or was considering lodging a claim. Third
parties would therefore have less opportunity to reverse a "closed"
lumping decision than an "open" potential claiming decision, thereby
increasing the overall frequency of lumping.
(2) It is likely, for the reasons already discussed, that a third party
would share the predominant social and cultural norms concerning
claiming behavior in response to injuries. As we have seen, in many
social settings those norms favor lumping and not claiming. There-
fore, the third party may more often attempt to cool off the occasional
"hot-headed" response by an injury victim rather than challenge a
modal response to lump.
(3) Discussion with a third party could make the injury victim more
aware of negative social stereotypes associated with injury victims
who claim or sue, since the third party would take a more objective
"external" view of the matter rather than focusing like the victim on
unique details of the accident that had just occurred.1 56
(4) If the third party is a close friend or family member, she may
adopt a protective attitude toward the injury victim and attempt to
offer cautionary advice that would shield her from social opprobrium
or even retaliation by the injurer, both of which may be more evident
to an observer who is not personally involved in the accident and can
adopt a more distanced perspective.
injury victims can be influenced by others to reformulate their autobiographical narratives and
absolve the injurers of responsibility.
155. See GREENHOUSE ET AL., supra note 123, at 128-29. The influence of the dispute audi-
ence is discussed by Jeffrey Fitzgerald and Richard Dickins, as well as Lynn Mather and Barbara
Yngvesson. See Jeffrey Fitzgerald & Richard Dickins, Disputing in Legal and Nonlegal Contexts:
Some Questions for Sociologists of Law, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 681, 695-96 (1980-1981); Lynn
Mather & Barbara Yngvesson, Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes, 15 LAw
& Soc'y REv. 775 (1980-1981).
156. Cf Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines
Executives' Decisions, HARV. Bus. REv., July 2003, at 56, 61, 63 (noting that taking an "outside
view" tends to produce more objective and reliable judgments than "internal views" that are
overly focused on the specifics of one's own situation).
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Whether interactions with third parties actually operate in these
ways to reinforce lumping rather than claiming is admittedly specula-
tive. One might imagine just the opposite effect-that third parties
could encourage rather than discourage claiming by offering informa-
tion about sources of legal advice. 157 More research is clearly needed
to explore the dynamics of narrative and response involving injury vic-
tims and third parties. Yet there can be little doubt of the general
importance of third-party interactions in reformulating the injury vic-
tim's internal autobiographical narrative. A conceptual model of inju-
ries based on the embodied mind cannot confine its attention to the
injury victim alone, but must also consider the recursive effects that
take place when narratives are shared with others, whose reactions
influence future telling of the same event.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fact that approximately nine out of ten injury victims lump their
losses rather than make any effort to lodge a claim has far-reaching
consequences for tort law. Most obviously, it means that the vast ma-
jority of injury victims forego a remedy. If they cannot pay for their
losses themselves, then they must somehow make do without compen-
sation-by borrowing from friends and family, incurring personal
debts, undergoing bankruptcy, or accessing government welfare.
Lumping has substantial social consequences. The predominance of
lumping also affects the mix of cases that cross the threshold of tort
law and thereby shape the field. A tendency to lump some kinds of
personal injuries, such as injuries on stairways, more frequently than
others, such as automobile injuries, can determine the doctrinal con-
tours of tort law and can thus open doors to certain types of claims
while closing doors to others. We need to understand which cases are
lumped in comparison to those that become claims or even lawsuits:
their relative strengths and weaknesses, the different types of injuries
involved, the characteristics of the parties, and much more. Yet, de-
spite the fact that lumping is enormously consequential for tort law
and society, researchers have done little more than note its existence
and its predominance among injury victims. 158
157. See, e.g., Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Mal-
practice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1359, 1361 (1992) (noting
that 33% of families that filed medical malpractice claims following perinatal injuries cited ad-
vice by knowledgeable acquaintances as a significant factor in their decision).
158. Cf. Saks, supra note 2, at 1174. Saks wrote twenty years ago about the importance of the
"base" (which includes cases of lumping as well as claiming) in understanding the behavior of
the entire tort law system: "Despite the indispensability of this ingredient to making sense of the
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This Article suggests that lumping can be better understood if it is
not viewed merely as the first in a series of rational decision points or
as the inevitable product of some vaguely defined cultural imperative.
These forms of explanation can be helpful, but they are inadequate in
themselves and should be incorporated into a broader conceptual
framework that takes into account contemporary research on human
cognition and decision making, as well as more sophisticated forms of
sociocultural interpretation.
Lumping in personal injury cases reveals the way in which the "em-
bodied mind" responds to painful and traumatic events, both con-
sciously and nonconsciously. Moreover, the embodied mind operates
in an environment that is organically connected to both brain and
body. To understand the prevalence of lumping, therefore, we must
consider how physical, social, and cultural features of the environment
become key features of an interpretive process that results in inaction
far more often than action. To the extent that aspects of the environ-
ment (including the media and the law itself) lend themselves to per-
ceptions of injuries as natural, inevitable, fated, or the fault of the
victim, lumping may appear to be not just the better choice but the
only conceivable response. And, as we have seen, social or political
arrangements in particular social settings may persuade injury victims
not to lodge claims even when they perceive that another party is re-
sponsible and want to pursue a remedy.
Finally, this Article suggests that a fully developed conceptual
framework must also take into account the interactions between in-
jury victims and those with whom they may discuss their experience.
A key feature of the "embodied mind" is the autobiographical narra-
tive that individuals convey during their interpersonal encounters. In
sharing these narratives with other people, individuals define a self
that can and should act in certain ways or refrain from action. Yet by
"distributing" 159 these narratives within their relational networks, in-
dividuals also open themselves to feedback and alternative framing of
important events such as injuries. Thus, social interactions can recur-
sively transform one's autobiographical narrative and point the indi-
vidual toward different behavioral options. These recursive effects
must be considered in a reconceptualization of lumping, and we must
ask whether and how they are likely to increase the likelihood of inac-
tion in response to personal injury. This Article speculates that inter-
behavior of the system, direct consideration of injury base rates is absent from virtually all com-
mentary and analysis of the tort litigation system." Id.
159. See BRUNER, supra note 141, at 114 (discussing his own concept of the "distributed
Self").
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personal interaction could enhance lumping for several reasons,
including asymmetries in the kinds of cases that are shared with confi-
dants, the moderating influence of the "external view," and the
probability that friends and family would reflect social and cultural
values opposed to claiming. Further, the confidants' awareness of
such values might cause them to discourage claiming in order to shield
the injury victim from stigmatization or retaliation by others.
Although existing research does not provide a comprehensive ex-
planation of the predominance of lumping in personal injury cases, it
unequivocally points to more promising theoretical models and ave-
nues of inquiry. Sociolegal scholarship has illuminated many features
of the tort law system in recent years, but the disposition of the vast
majority of injury cases before the victim takes any action still remains
shrouded in mystery. A thoughtful and methodologically broad-based
exploration of the cases in which the victim lumps rather than claims
can tell us a great deal about the workings of tort. law in society and
the areas of social life it does not reach.
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